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I. INTRODUCTION 
Could patents contribute to incentivizing companies to manufacture and 
market healthier foodstuffs and beverages?  How could the patent system be 
amended to enable such a contribution and thus play a role in the fight against 
diseases caused by the consumption of unhealthy food?  More generally, is the 
patent system suitable for carrying out such tasks?  In this article I will try to 
answer these questions and in doing so I will put forward three proposals. 
As is well known, the need to supply healthy food and beverages1 
 
 * Senior Lecturer, City University London. An earlier version of this work was presented at 
the 34th ATRIP (Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property) 
Conference, held in Cape Town, South Africa from September 27–30, 2015. 
1.  Hereinafter, I will use the general term “food” to refer to both food and beverages.  
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constitutes an important priority globally, as many people in both industrialized 
and developing countries struggle with obesity and other noncommunicable 
diseases (NCDs) caused by the consumption of unhealthy products.  Such need 
has been stressed in several international fora, such as the 2004 World Health 
Organization (WHO) Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, 
the 2011 United Nations (UN) Political Declaration on NCDs, and the WHO 
Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of NCDs 2013–2020.2 
recent data clarifies why it is important to take action urgently.  Obesity 
worldwide has more than doubled since 1980.3  In 2014, over 1.9 billion adults 
were overweight and of these more than 600 million were obese.4  That means 
that thirty-nine percent of adults were overweight in 2014 and thirteen percent 
were obese.5  In fact, “most of the world’s population live in countries where 
being overweight and obesity kill more people than being underweight.”6  And, 
in 2013, forty-two million children five years old and younger were overweight 
or obese.7 
It is also well known that obesity increases the risk of NCDs, such as 
coronary heart disease, stroke, high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer (including 
endometrial, breast and colon cancer), cholesterol, liver and gallbladder 
disease, infertility, and mental health conditions.8  NCDs kill thirty-eight 
million people each year worldwide, and an unhealthy diet is the main risk 
factor.9  Additionally, 2.8 million people die yearly as a result of diet-related 
NCDs.10 
Obesity and other illnesses derived from the consumption of unhealthy food 
also entails high economic costs for societies and cause reduced work 
productivity. 
 
2.  WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GLOBAL STRATEGY ON DIET, PHYSICAL ACTIVITY AND 
HEALTH [WHA 57.17] (2004), available at http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/strategy/eb1134
4/strategy_english_web.pdf; G.A. Res. 66/2, Political Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the 
General Assembly on the Prevention and Control of Non-communicable Diseases (Jan. 24, 2012).   
3.  Obesity and Overweight, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 2015), http://www.who.int/mediace
ntre/factsheets/fs311/en.  
4.  Id.  
5.  Id.  
6.  Id.  
7.  Id.  
8.  Obesity, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/gho/ncd/risk_factors/obesity_text/en/ 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2016).  
9.  Noncommunicable Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 2016), http://www.who.int/medi
acentre/factsheets/fs355/en/.  
10. DR. ALA ALWAN, WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL STATUS REPORT ON 
NONCOMMUNICABLE DISEASES 2010 2 (2011), available at http://www.who.int/nmh/publications
/ncd_report_full_en.pdf. Such data has also been presented by Paolo Vergano, Presentation for the 
Summer Academy in Global Food Law and Policy in Bilboa, Spain (July 22, 2015). 
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This article will make the point that using the patent system and, in 
particular, amending certain substantial and procedural rules, may be one of the 
answers to the above problems.  Indeed, I believe that patent law, far from being 
neutral, should deal with these issues and be capable of pushing food companies 
into manufacturing healthier products.  This belief can be echoed in the words 
of the former Director General of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Pascal 
Lamy: “The international [intellectual property] system cannot operate in 
isolation from broader public policy questions, such as how to meet human 
needs as basic as health[and] food.”11  It should also be remembered that the 
right to health, which includes the right to consume healthy food, is protected 
as a fundamental and human right by international and regional provisions, such 
as the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights: “Everyone has the right 
to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of 
his family, including food.”12  The European Union (EU) is also particularly 
keen to protect people’s health.  Indeed, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
reminds us that “a high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the 
definition and implementation of all the Union’s policies and activities.”13 
II. FOOD-RELATED PATENTS: SOME EXAMPLES 
The proposals I will highlight appear to be timely as food and beverage-
related patents are increasingly applied for and granted around the world, 
especially in the United States (U.S.).  An examination of several databases 
revealed the existence of many patents related to new and improved foodstuffs. 
Take, for example, the U.S. Patent No. 5260087 covering an invention 
entitled “Fat and egg yolk substitute for use in baking and process for using 
substitute.”14  As is explained in the patent’s specification, “fats and eggs 
produce[] desirable taste and sensory qualities in the baked goods,” but “also 
contribute much fat and cholesterol to the baked items.”15  The main purpose 
“of this invention [is] to provide a low-fat compound which can be used in 
baking cookies and cakes as a substitute for fats and egg yolks, while still 
producing the desired product taste and sensory qualities.”16  This invention 
 
11.  Pascal Lamy, WTO Director General, speech given at the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) Conference on IP and Public Policy Issues in Geneva, Switzerland (July 14, 
2009), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl131_e.htm.   
12.  G.A. Res. 217 A, art. 25, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
13.  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 35, 2000/C 364/01 (Dec. 18, 
2000). 
14.  The patent application was filed with the USPTO in Sept. 1992 and the patent has therefore 
expired. U.S. Patent No. 5260087 (filed Sept. 29, 1992).  
15.  Id.  
16.  Id.  
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further aims “to provide a very low fat compound and a method of using it that 
will not only produce a tasty and tender baked item, but will also contribute to 
increased item shelf life.”17 
The U.S. Patent No. 8647696 is also relevant.18  The invention comprises 
of a shelf stable and low-fat food containing gas bubbles.19  The applicant notes 
in the specification the food industry’s need to meet low-fat targets while 
keeping the taste of the product as appealing as possible: 
Particularly in the West, obesity is a major cause for concern. Health 
conscious consumers are increasingly looking for products that have 
low fat and calorific content. However, they are often not prepared to 
accept healthier alternatives that have poor (or even different) taste 
and/or texture to the traditional products. Thus, food manufacturers face 
the problem of making low fat alternatives to some of the consumers’ 
favourite products such as desserts, cooking sauces and salad dressings 
that not only taste as good but that also give the same texture and 
sensation in the mouth when eaten. Fat plays an important role in giving 
products their distinctive texture as well as taste. Although fat can be 
removed and/or substituted to produce a healthier product, if it does not 
have the same organoleptic properties as the equivalent ‘full fat’ 
alternative it may not meet with customer acceptance.20 
Analogous concerns are expressed in the description of the U.S. Patent No. 
6485775 covering a starchy, food-based fine particle useful as a fat substitute 
in a variety of food products: 
For many years, doctors have recommended low fat diets. Accordingly, 
the food industry has directed substantial effort at finding fat substitutes 
which demonstrate the taste and mouth feel characteristics of fats 
without their detrimental properties . . . . Potato granules and flakes are 
commercially available sources of dehydrated potato product having 
known characteristics. However, they have not been used as a fat 
mimetic. There is a need for an inexpensive fat mimetic which does not 
have the detrimental effects of fat on the consumer.21 
 
 
17.  Id.  
18.  The application was filed with the USPTO on Dec. 9, 2009 and the patent was granted on 
Feb. 11, 2014. U.S. Patent No. 8,647,696 (filed Dec. 9, 2009).  
19.  Id. 
20.  Id.  
21.  U.S. Patent No. 6,485,775 (filed Oct. 15, 1999).  
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A similar invention is described in the International Patent No. WO 
2013162802 A1, which refers to fat particle compositions containing salt, 
dough, and baked-dough articles made therefrom, and related methods.22  The 
specification explains that 
These fat particle[s] can be used to prepare dough formulations that 
meet the desire of being more healthful than previous dough 
formulations due to a reduced sodium content, optional more healthful 
fat content (e.g., low trans fats or low saturated fats), or both . . . . These 
days, consumers, regulators, and food companies desire to lower total 
sodium content in food products . . . . Fats typically used in these types 
of dough products are triglyceride-based fats that commonly contain a 
fairly high level of saturated fats and trans fatty acids. Due to a present 
trend toward healthier dough and bakery products, there is demand for 
products that contain healthier fats (i.e., having a reduced amount of 
saturated fats and trans fatty acids) without sacrificing taste and baking 
performance of the dough. In view of the foregoing, alternative fat 
compositions that are low in saturated and trans fatty acids are very 
desirable.23 
The above are just a few examples of patents that protect healthier food 
products or processes.  They show the interest of certain sectors of the food 
industry in fighting obesity and related illnesses by developing improved 
foodstuffs and accordingly meeting the concerns of an increasingly conscious 
category of consumers aware of the risks stemming from the consumption of 
highly fatty and highly, caloric products. 
III. PROPOSALS TO AMEND PATENT REGIMES TO INCENTIVIZE THE 
PRODUCTION OF HEALTHY FOODSTUFFS 
The trend of healthy-food patenting is certainly a positive step for the 
purpose of enhancing consumers’ health.  The fact that food companies 
spontaneously feel the need to come up with healthier products, even when 
prompted by the mere desire to pursue commercial profits, is not only a trend 
that should be praised, but it should also be incentivized.  Food is indeed a low-
profit-margin business.  Indeed, as it is necessary for everyday life, everyone 
buys food.  This entails that companies that manufacture and sell food face 
more competition than other businesses, which push prices down toward 
marginal cost and drives profit down toward the minimum that lets business 
 
22.  This international patent application was filed through the PCT route on Mar. 22, 2013. 
International Patent No. WO 2013162802 A1 (filed Mar. 22, 2013).  
23.  Id.  
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survive.  Such low profit margins clearly give patents a much stronger incentive 
effect in the food industry than in any other sector.24 
That is why I propose to utilize and amend patent regimes and procedures 
with the specific aim of encouraging the production of healthier foodstuffs.  The 
first and second proposals are “positive” as they aim at speeding up or 
facilitating the patenting process for foods that are considered, and proven to 
be, healthy.25  The third proposal would instead consist of excluding from 
patentability inventions related to food if it is proven that the relevant products 
or processes contain unhealthy ingredients.  It is, therefore, a “negative” 
proposal.  As noted by Friedrich-Karl Beier back in 1972, if the aim of the 
patent system is to stimulate inventions that are useful to people, then “two 
conclusions should be self-evident: first, inventions that are of no use or even 
damaging to society should not be patented, and, second, inventions that are of 
special and particular utility . . . for society should be patentable and even enjoy 
preferential treatment.”26 
A. Fast-Track Procedures for Patent Applications Related to Healthy Food 
The first proposal would consist of setting up a fast-track procedure for 
patent applications covering foodstuffs that contain macronutrients such as 
proteins, vitamins, iodate, or other healthy ingredients so as to provide an 
expedited examination of the relevant patentability requirements.  The target is 
to incentivize the production of healthy food.  This seems to be in line with the 
aim of the patent system, which is to encourage and reward the making of 
inventions useful to society. 
As a general remark, the idea that certain socially useful technologies 
should be given priority and special treatment is not new.  Several national 
medicines regulators already provide an accelerated review process for the most 
important drugs.  The U.S. Food and Drug Administration is one of these.  It 
has indeed expedited its review process for medicines that treat serious or life-
threatening diseases.27 
 
24.  Jay Dratler Jr, Food Patents: The Unintended Consequence, 8 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 4 
(2015). 
25.  Not so different from the proposals highlighted by Estelle Derclaye in relation to 
environmentally sound inventions in Estelle Derclaye, Should Patent Law Help Cool the Planet? An 
Inquiry from the Point of View of Environmental Law: Part 2, INT’L ENERGY L. REV. 229, 229–37 
(2009).  
26.  Friedrich-Karl Beier, Future Problems of Patent Law, 3 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. 
COPYRIGHT L. 423–450, 441, 443 (1972) (also wondering: “should we not accord preferential 
treatment to inventions that are of special significance for society, examine them more quickly, publish 
them earlier, and protect them more broadly?”). 
27.  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS – 
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“Speedy” patent procedures are already available in several countries and 
can be used for any kind of technology: the European and the United Kingdom 
(UK) patent offices are good examples.28  The U.S. Patent Office also has in 
place a three-track prioritized examination system that allows applicants in any 
field of technology to choose between three examination procedures: 
prioritized examination, traditional examination, and delayed examination.29  
Such accelerated proceedings produce certain advantages as they permit 
applicants to begin licensing their inventions sooner, thus reducing the time to 
reach the market and accordingly speeding up the dissemination of the relevant 
products. 
Fast-track patent procedures have also been, or are currently being offered, 
in relation to specific sectors, for example, in the field of green technologies: 
pioneering countries have been the U.S.,30 the UK, Australia, South Korea, 
Israel, Canada, and Japan.31  These programs have been set up with a view to 
reduce the time needed for an application regarding environmentally sound 
technologies, permitting “green” applicants to obtain patents sooner, and, thus, 
encouraging further innovation in this socially-relevant field.32  Indeed, for 
industries where there is a very urgent need for the development of new 
technologies, like the renewable energy sector, delay hurts both inventors and 
the public.33 
Reserving accelerated procedures to socially important inventions does not 
 
DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS §§ V, VII, VIII (2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomp
lianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm358301.pdf.   
28.  The EPO has an accelerated examination procedure in place that anyone can use at no 
additional cost. The UK Patent Office offers three different types of accelerated examination. The first 
two types, Combined Search and Examination and Early Publication, are available to anyone upon 
request. The third one is Accelerated Search and Examination, which aims at issuing a search report 
within four months of the application. 
29.  USPTO Proposes to Establish Three Patent Processing Tracks, USPTO (June 3, 2010), 
http://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-proposes-establish-three-patent-processing-
tracks.  
30.  The USPTO Green Technology Pilot Program closed in early 2012. Green Technology 
Pilot Program – Closed, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/green-technology-pilot-
program-closed (last visited Apr. 2, 2016).  
31.  The first country to launch this program was the UK in May 2009. See Press Release, UK 
Intellectual Property Office, UK “Green” Inventions to Get Fast-Tracked Through Patent System (May 
12, 2009), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140603093549/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/about/
press/press-release/press-release-2009/press-release-20090512.htm; see also ERIC LANE, CLEAN 
TECH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECO-MARKS, GREEN PATENTS, AND GREEN INNOVATION  218–26 
(Lexis Nexus 2013). 
32.  See Amanda Patton, When Patent Offices Become Captain Planet: Green Technology and 
Accelerated Patent Examination Programs in the United States and Abroad, 3 INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 
30 (2012). 
33.  See Sarah Tran, Expediting Innovation, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 123, 139 (2012).  
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constitute an absolute novelty either.  In 1959, U.S. patent provisions already 
included an exception to the examination order, clarifying that applications 
could be assessed out of turn if “the inventions are deemed of peculiar 
importance to some brunch of the public service and the head of some 
department of the Government requests immediate due action for that reason.”34  
Similar procedures are now offered in other countries as well.  The Australian 
Patent Office, for example, has in place an “expedited examination” system that 
allows patent applications to be assessed more rapidly if the commissioner 
believes that it “is in the public interest” or that “there are special circumstances 
that make it desirable.”35  Since 1986, the Japanese Patent Office has also 
operated an accelerated examination program (which was amended in 2004), 
which applies inter alia to socially relevant inventions, such as earthquake 
disaster recovery technology.36 
In light of the above, I believe that introducing fast-track procedures for 
socially-relevant inventions, like healthy foodstuffs, would not be 
revolutionary.  There would be no need for big procedural changes.  Applicants 
that ask for the proposed fast track would just need to mention in the application 
that their products or processes contain healthy ingredients.37  And patent 
examiners should be tasked with confirming this.  It is important that applicants 
should not bear the burden of proof that the invention is healthy: otherwise, 
food companies or individual inventors may be discouraged from innovating in 
this socially-important sector.38 
As has already been proposed in relation to fast-track procedures for green 
patenting,39 it would be wise to devise this fast-track procedure in the context 
 
34.  See 37 C.F.R. §1.102 (1959); Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, Republication of 
Regulations, 24 Fed. Reg. 10,332, 10,340 (Dec. 22, 1959) (to be codified at 37 CFR §1.102 (1959)). 
35.  Patent Regulations 1991 (Cth), reg 3.17(2)(a)–(b) (Austl.). 
36.  The other categories of inventions admitted to the Japanese program are now: (i) working-
related applications; (ii) internationally filed applications; (iii) applications filed by small and medium-
sized enterprises, individuals, universities, public research institutes etc; (iv) green technology related 
applications; and (v) Asian business location law related applications. See Outline of Accelerated 
Examination and Accelerated Appeal Examination, JAPAN PAT. OFF. (July 23, 2004), http://www.jpo
.go.jp/torikumi_e/.  
37.  A similar feature is shared by fast track procedures adopted in the field of green 
technologies by the UK, Australia, South Korea, Japan, Israel, and Canada. Simple statements by 
applicants are here sufficient, and patent offices do not require them to provide particular evidence to 
show the “environmentally friendliness” of their inventions. See ANTOINE DECHEZLEPRÊTRE, FAST-
TRACKING GREEN PATENT APPLICATIONS – AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR 
TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: ISSUE PAPER NO. 37 3–4 (2013). 
38. A similar proposal and argument have been put forward in the field of environmentally 
sound technologies: see Estelle Derclaye, Intellectual Property Rights and Global Warming, 12 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 263, 264 (2008). 
39.  See Eric Lane, Building the Global Green Patent Highway: A Proposal for International 
Harmonization of Green Technology Fast Track Programs, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1119, 1147–50 
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of an international treaty.  A treaty that could serve this purpose is the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT), which assists applicants in obtaining patent 
protection internationally for their inventions and helps offices with their 
decisions to grant or refuse the patent.40  An international harmonization of fast-
track procedures would help in overcoming the difficulties stemming from 
differences between national fast-track procedures.  Such differences may 
indeed make participation in multiple fast-track programs expensive and 
lengthy, as applicants who wish to protect their inventions in several 
jurisdictions would have to comply with different procedural rules.  An 
international harmonized fast-track program, with similar rules and 
requirements, would instead reduce burdens on applicants and, thus, speed up 
and make cheaper the patenting process for healthy foodstuffs.  It would also 
boost participation.  Additional burdens on applicants should also be avoided, 
such as conducting prior art searches and analysis, which are usually requested 
when it comes to patenting ordinary inventions.  In this way the entire process 
would be accelerated.41 
B. Exempting Healthy Food and Beverage Patent Applications 
 from Paying Fees 
The second proposal would consist of exempting applicants for healthy 
food patents from paying patent procedure fees, or at least significantly 
reducing them.  Again, applicants should mention the healthiness of their 
products and processes in the application and patent offices should confirm that 
the inventions in question are healthy.  As with the proposal for fast tracking, 
highlighted in the previous section, this proposal would aim at encouraging and 
facilitating patent protection, and production, of healthy foodstuffs. 
Indeed, patent fees may sometimes be unaffordable, especially for small 
and medium-sized enterprises.  Take the large number of fees required by the 
European Patent Office (EPO): filing fees, search fees, fees per designated 
state, fees per claim over ten claims, examination fees, and a fee for the patent 
grant and printing.42  U.S. patent procedures are also very expensive.  Indeed, 
applicants in the U.S. must carry out a pre-examination search of all prior art, 
including previous patents and patent applications, and non-patent 
 
(2012). 
40.  See Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645. 
41.  The above suggestions build upon analogous ones put forward with reference to fast track 
programs for green technologies based inventions. See Lane, Building the Global Green Patent 
Highway, supra note 39, at 1160–70. 
42.  See Schedule of Fees, EUR. PAT. OFF., http://www.epoline.org/portal/portal/default/epoli
ne.Scheduleoffees (last visited Apr. 2, 2016).  
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documentation, which can easily cost thousands of dollars in fees.43 
C. Excluding Unhealthy Food from Patentability 
The third proposal would consist of excluding from patentability food 
products and processes that contain an excessive amount of unhealthy 
ingredients or components such as salt, fat, and sugar.  Specific and clear 
thresholds identified by health specialists should be introduced in order to guide 
both applicants and patent examiners–and the latter should confirm that the 
relevant invention is harmful to consumers. 
This proposal may be particularly useful in countries that have recently 
experienced, or might experience in the future, an upsurge in the filing of patent 
applications related to unhealthy food.  China seems to have recently witnessed 
such a trend, as has been noted by the Task Group of Patent Examination 
Cooperation Center of the Chinese Intellectual Property Office, which has 
found that several patents have been granted to food possibly harmful to 
consumers’ health.44  This has occurred despite the fact that China has recently 
passed nearly 800 laws and regulations to protect food safety and the health and 
life of domestic consumers.45 
The proposal could be implemented by introducing an ad hoc exclusion 
from patentability of inventions harmful to human health.  This type of new 
category could be inserted in patent laws such as the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)46 and the 
European Patent Convention (EPC),47 right next to the exclusion from 
patentability of surgical, diagnostic, or therapeutical methods,48 which also 
protects public health, although in another fashion (basically by preventing the 
 
43.  See Tran, supra note 33, at 141. 
44.  See Task Group of Patent Examination Cooperation Center, State Intellectual Property 
Office, Patent Examination to Safeguard Food and Health Products, CHINA INTELL. PROP. (July 13, 
2011), http://ipr.chinadaily.com.cn/2011-07/13/content_12895645.htm.  
45.  See id.  
46.  See The TRIPS Agreement is one of the WTO Agreements. See Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS – RESULT OF THE URUGUAY ROUNDS 
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].  
47.  See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 
[hereinafter EPC]. 
48.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, at art. 27(3); EPC, supra note 47, at 53(c). Article 27(3) 
TRIPS allows countries to exclude from patentability diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for 
the treatment of humans or animals. Likewise, Article 53(c) of the EPC states that “European patents 
shall not be granted in respect of . . . methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery 
or therapy and diagnostic methods practised on the human or animal body.” EPC, supra note 47, at 
53(c).  
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monopolization of medically important methods).49 
Alternatively, we could support a broad interpretation of those provisions 
that prohibit the patenting of inventions contrary to ordre public and morality.  
Many jurisdictions have introduced such a ban, availing themselves of the 
relevant TRIPS provision.50  The EPC also states that “European patents shall 
not be granted in respect of . . . inventions the commercial exploitation of which 
would be contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality.”51  The U.S. has not 
incorporated a statutory ban in this regard, but inventions that are considered 
immoral seem to be excluded from patentability under a common law moral 
utility doctrine.52 
It could, indeed, be argued that inventions related to unhealthy food, whose 
consumption may cause obesity and other diseases, should be excluded from 
patentability on these grounds.  I am aware that this exception has often been 
interpreted by courts and patent offices, especially in Europe, in a very narrow 
way.53  Yet, the subject matter seems here to be particularly alarming and, thus, 
 
49.  U.S. patent law permits patenting of medical methods but denies a remedy for its 
infringement, therefore nullifying the right in so far as there is no enforceability. 
50.  Article 27(2) TRIPS provides that countries may exclude from patentability “inventions, 
the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect 
ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious 
prejudice to the environment.” TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, at art. 27(2).  
51.  EPC, supra note 47, at art. 53(a).  
52.  The moral utility doctrine dates back to Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1817) (the judge held in this case that “the law will not allow the plaintiff to recover, if the 
invention be of mischievous or injurious tendency” and gave the examples of inventions aimed at 
poisoning people, promoting debauchery and facilitating private assassinations). The doctrine in 
question was also invoked to refuse patents for inventions related to gambling devices (see, e.g., 
Reliance Novelty Corp v. Dworzek, 80 F. 902, 904 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897), invalidating the patent for 
“lack of utility”). Yet, such a doctrine has not been invoked to invalidate patents in recent years, 
prompting several commentators to hold that it is a dead doctrine. See Margo A Bagley, Patent First, 
Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469 (2003). 
53.  See the decisions of the EPO in a string of cases concerning the patentability of 
biotechnological inventions: see, e.g. case T 0315/03, Transgenic Animals/HARVARD (OJ 2004); case 
T 356/93 Plant Cells/PLANT GENETIC SYSTEMS (OJ 1995); case T 0272/95, Howard Florey/Relaxin 
(OJ 1995, 541). The literature on the morality and ordre public exception in the biotech sector is 
extensive: see generally SIGRID STERCKX, BIOTECHNOLOGY, PATENTS AND MORALITY (2d ed., 
Ashgate 2000); Sivaramjani Thambisetty, Understanding Morality as a Ground for Exclusion from 
Patentability Under European Law, 12 EUBIOS J. ASIAN INT’L BIOETHICS 48–53 (2002); AURORA 
PLOMER, STEM CELL PATENTS: EUROPEAN PATENT LAW AND ETHICS REPORT (2006), 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/~llzwww/StemCellProject/project.report.pdf; Tine Sommer, 
Interpreting Ordre Public and Morality in a Patent Law Context: Which is the Correct Approach?, 9 
BIO-SCIENCE L. REV. 62–74 (2007); Sigrid Sterckx, The European Patent Convention and the (Non-
)patentability of Human Embryonic Stem Cells, INTELL. PROP. Q. 478 (2008); EMBRYONIC STEM CELL 
PATENTS: EUROPEAN PATENT LAW AND ETHICS (Aurora Plomer & Paul Torremans eds., Oxford 
2009); OLIVER MILLS, BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS: MORAL RESTRAINTS AND PATENT LAW 
(Ashgate 2010); Enrico Bonadio, Biotech Patents and Morality After Brüstle, EUR. INTELL. PROP. 
REV. 433–43 (2012). 
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capable of being caught by the provision at issue.54 
If such applications are filed in Europe, patent offices could rely on the 
costs/benefits analysis criterion used by the EPO in some cases, including the 
Onco Mouse Harvard case.55  In the final decision of that saga, the EPO 
confirmed the validity of a patent related to a mouse that had been genetically 
engineered to develop cancer and could be used for anticancer research.56  The 
EPO examined, on the one hand, the advantages for the treatment of cancer and, 
on the other, the environmental risks that could stem from the use of the said 
invention, and concluded that the benefits overwhelmed the costs.57  In contrast, 
a patent examiner or judge tasked with assessing a food invention extremely 
harmful to consumers’ health would probably weigh the possible costs 
(increased chances of obesity and other NCDs) and benefits (e.g. keeping the 
taste of the product as appealing to consumers as possible) in favour of the 
former, and thus refuse the patent.  A similar outcome was reached by the EPO 
in Upjohn, where a patent application related to a transgenic mouse into which 
a gene had been inserted so that it would lose its hair was rejected.58  The 
invention aimed at testing products to treat human baldness and wool 
production techniques: the EPO again used a utilitarian approach and weighed 
up costs (animal suffering) and benefits (research to cure hair loss and improved 
wool manufacturing techniques), but in this case the former obviously 
outweighed the latter, so the invention was deemed immoral and thus not 
patentable.59  A parallel could, therefore, be drawn between this decision and 
the case of unhealthy food inventions.60 
Also, the letter of the relevant TRIPS provision should militate in favour of 
 
54.  See, e.g., Tine Sommer, Interpreting Ordre Public and Morality in a Patent Law Context: 
Which Is the Correct Approach?, 2 Bio-Sci. L. Rev. 67 (2006/2007) (noting that “Article 53(a) EPC 
constitutes a blanket clause, which ensures the incorporation of fundamental ethical and legal 
principles in patent law, framed as to accommodate future developments”).  
55.  See Harvard College v. Canada, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 (Can.).  
56.  Id.  
57.  See again the decision Transgenic Animals/HARVARD, case T 0315/03, Transgenic 
Animals/HARVARD (OJ 2004), which confirmed the validity of the patent by relying on a 
costs/benefits analysis (paras 9.1–9.7 and 13.2.1–13.24). See also GUY TRITTON, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN EUROPE 135–136 (Sweet & Maxwell 2008). 
58.  See Case T0791/96, Pseudorabies/UPJOHN (1999).  
59.  See European Patent Application No. 89913146.0 (filed Nov. 27, 1989, refused July 25, 
1993). 
60.  The utilitarian approach is not accepted by all scholars, though. Other commentators prefer 
the so-called “deontological approach,” according to which inventions are considered contrary to 
public policy and morality even though they bring more benefits than disadvantages. In other words, 
the fact that an invention produces real or potential benefits cannot “neutralize” immoral aspects 
stemming from the exploitation of the same. See Sterckx, The European Patent Convention, supra 
note 53, at 487–90, 494. The application of the deontological criterion to unhealthy inventions would 
again make such subject matter unpatentable on morality and ordre public grounds. 
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a broader interpretation of the ordre public and morality clause, so as to apply 
it to food products and processes that are scientifically proven to be harmful to 
human health. Indeed, Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement expressly 
specifies that human health falls within the category of interests protected by 
the morality and public policy clause.61  Even before the TRIPS Agreement, the 
expression ordre public had been interpreted as including a large range of 
public policy grounds, and in particular any matter in the general interests of 
the state and society,62 and there is little doubt that the fight against obesity and 
other diseases caused by the consumption of harmful foodstuffs amounts to a 
strong interest of the state and society.  Secondly, the proposal to exclude from 
patentability unhealthy food also seems in line with the very purpose of patent 
law, which is to incentivize the realization of inventions that are really useful 
to societies, not products or processes harmful to people’s health. 
D. Additional Proposals? 
The above could be stand-alone proposals, but they could also be merged. 
The first and second proposals, for example, could be linked, so that applicants 
for healthy foodstuffs would not be required to pay fees for accelerated 
examination procedures.  Also, countries particularly keen on protecting and 
promoting food security and good nutrition could provide a mix of “positive” 
and “negative” measures and cumulatively: (i) set up a fast-track patent 
procedure for healthy food applicants; (ii) exempt such applicants from paying 
the relevant fees (or greatly reduce them); and (iii) exclude from patentability 
unhealthy foodstuffs. 
Other proposals could be made with a view to amend patent regimes and 
encourage the dissemination of healthy foodstuffs: namely extending the term 
of protection.63  The idea underlying this proposal is to provide extra years of 
patent protection in order to strongly encourage the making of healthy food 
products and processes. Such a proposal would probably be compliant with the 
TRIPS Agreement as this treaty only states as a minimum standard to provide 
at least twenty years of protection counted from the filing date.64  That means 
 
61.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, at art. 27(2). 
62.  This interpretation was given by a UK committee when attempting to implement the 
requirements of the 1963 Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on 
Patents for Invention (Strasbourg Convention 1963). See GREAT BRITAIN, COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE 
THE PATENT SYSTEM AND PATENT LAW & M.A.L. BANKS, THE BRITISH PATENT SYSTEM: REPORT 
OF THE COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE THE PATENT SYSTEM AND PATENT LAW 68 (H.M. Stationery Office 
1970). 
63.  A similar proposal was mentioned in the early 1990s with reference to environmentally 
sound technologies in Nicola Atkinson & Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property and Environmental 
Protection, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 165–170, 170 (1991); see also Derclaye, supra note 25, at 232. 
64.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, at art. 33. Article 33 TRIPS states that “the term of 
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that countries can offer inventors a longer term of protection if they so wish, as 
is also confirmed by the TRIPS Agreement itself, which leaves WTO countries 
free “to implement in their law more extensive protection.”65  Yet, despite its 
formal compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, I would not recommend such a 
proposal to be implemented.  Indeed, extending the term of protection beyond 
the twenty-year barrier would have undesirable anti-competitive effects by 
delaying the entrance into the public domain of socially relevant inventions. 
IV. OBJECTIONS AND COUNTER-ARGUMENTS 
That said, one may note that the three proposals suggested in this article, by 
requiring that food inventions should be treated differently (more favorably in 
the first and second proposals and less favorably in the third one), provide a 
discriminatory treatment in favor of, or against, the food industry.  This 
situation would, therefore, discriminate against other fields of technology and, 
thus, violate the TRIPS Agreement’s anti-discrimination rule: “patents shall be 
available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to . . . the field 
of technology.”66 
One may also argue that the proposals would make patenting procedures 
and related litigation in court rather cumbersome.  They would first introduce 
difficulties for patent examiners and judges—that is in confirming that the 
relevant invention is either healthy (first and second proposals) or harmful to 
human health (third proposal). Fast-track procedures, in particular, would make 
the whole patenting process even more complicated and expensive to handle 
for patent offices, also taking into account that giving priority to certain 
inventions would require extra efforts from offices.  All this would, therefore, 
amount to unreasonable conditions on the acquisition and maintenance of the 
patent, again, contrary to the TRIPS Agreement, which requires, as a condition 
of the acquisition or maintenance of intellectual property rights, countries’ 
“compliance with reasonable procedures and formalities.”67 
 
protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the 
filing date.” 
65.  Id. at art. 1(1). 
66.  Id. at art. 27(1). Both negative and positive discrimination may be deemed inconsistent 
with this provision. As has been noted, “a law that unjustifiably favors patentees in one field of 
technology over all other fields can be just as discriminatory as a law that unjustifiably disadvantages 
patentees in one field of technology relative to all other fields.” See Maria Victoria Stout, Crossing the 
TRIPS Nondiscrimination Line: How CAFTA Pharmaceutical Patent Provisions Violate TRIPS Article 
27.1, 14 B.U. J. SCI. TECH. L. 177, 182 (2008); see also Carlos Correa, Public Health and Patent 
Legislation in Developing Countries, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 7 (2001).  
67.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, at art. 62(1) (emphasis added). This provision has been 
interpreted by the Panel Report, Canada–Term of Patent Protection, WTO Doc. WT/DS170/R (May 
5, 2000). The Panel held that some Canadian patent law provisions (which required applicants to resort 
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Yet, such objections would be weak for the following reasons. 
A.  Discrimination vs. Differentiation 
I do believe that the proposals in question do not constitute a discriminatory 
treatment either against or in favor of the food industry.  Far from constituting 
a discriminatory treatment, these proposals boil down to a lawful differential 
treatment that is necessary to meet a socially sensitive objective in a specific 
sector, namely the protection of human health. 
As far as the first and second proposals are concerned, as it is accepted that 
patent law gives incentives to come up with new technologies, there is no 
reason (in principle) why public policy should not try to give greater incentives 
to develop specific products or processes that are considered particularly 
beneficial to society.68  Take the example of accelerated procedures in the field 
of green-technologies that—as we have seen—have already been adopted in 
several jurisdictions.  These have never provoked objections regarding possible 
discriminatory treatment over other fields of technology that do not have access 
to a similar preferential track.69  It would, thus, be difficult to claim that the first 
proposal put forward here, which shares similar features and is also meant to 
meet socially-relevant targets, is discriminatory.  The incentive-related 
argument could again be relied on to justify and legitimize fee waivers (or 
reductions) for patenting healthy food.  It should also be noted that such a 
preferential scheme is not completely new, at least in the scripts of intellectual 
property scholars: already in 1972 Freidrich-Karl Beier noted that “in the 
future, other possibilities for preferential treatment of socially important 
inventions might be adopted, such as reducing fees for the application, grant 
and maintenance of patents.”70 
The distinction between unlawful discrimination and lawful differential 
treatment in the field of intellectual property rights has already been stressed 
by the WTO Panel in Canada—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical 
 
to delays such as abandonment of the application, reinstatement, non-payment of fees and non-
response to a patent examiner’s report) would be inconsistent with the general principle that procedures 
should not be unnecessarily complicated as expressed in inter alia Article 62.1 TRIPS Agreement 
(paras 6.117–6.119 of the report). See generally TRIPS, supra note 46, at art. 62.1, paras. 6.117–6.119.  
68.  See Daniel Alexander, Some Themes in Intellectual Property and the Environment, 2 
INTELL. PROP. & ENVTL. 113, 116 (1993). The third proposal highlighted in this article also aims (at 
least indirectly) at encouraging the production of healthier food. Indeed, if food companies are aware 
that harmful food cannot be patented, they will probably switch to less harmful ones. 
69.  Back in 1972, Rudolf E. Blum made the point that a special status should be granted to 
inventions concerned with the protection of the environment, praising, in particular, the U.S. and Japan 
for granting such inventions a privileged and accelerated treatment. See Rudolf E Blum, The Threat to 
Our Environment and the Protection of Industrial Property, INDUS. PROP. 243, 248–49 (1973). 
70.  Beier, supra note 26, at 445. 
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Products: the principle of discrimination—the Panel held—”does not prohibit 
bona fide exceptions to deal with problems that may exist only in certain 
product areas.”71  This finding sanctioned the lawfulness of certain Canadian 
exceptions to patents under Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement that de facto 
targeted the pharmaceutical sector.72  Yet, the “spirit” of this finding could be 
relied on to also support a broad interpretation of ordre public and morality 
clauses, such as the TRIPS Agreement and EPC ones, if not to create an ad hoc 
exclusion from patentability of unhealthy foodstuff (see above the first 
‘negative’ proposal).  Indeed, excluding from patentability inventions harmful 
to humans could amount to a bona fide public health measure aimed at 
discouraging the development and dissemination of harmful food, and 
accordingly defeating (or at least mitigating) serious extenuating 
circumstances. 
There is no discrimination then, just lawful differentiation.  Several other 
scholars have highlighted the need to consider the latter (as opposed to the 
former) as legitimate. For example, with particular reference to the 
pharmaceutical field, Frederick Abbott pointed out that if specific rules 
applicable only to pharmaceutical patents are necessary to address important 
public interests such as the protection of public health, “this does not constitute 
‘discrimination’ against the field of pharmaceutical technology.  It constitutes 
recognition of legitimate public interests in differential treatment.”73 
Thus, when it comes to devising intellectual property, and specifically 
patent legislations, governments should be able to adopt measures on public 
interest grounds—such as the proposals put forward in this article—to meet 
specific concerns in certain fields.  This can also be inferred by Article 8 of the 
TRIPS Agreement: “Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and 
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, 
and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development.”74  Analogous provisions can be 
found in bilateral investments and free-trade agreements, such as amongst the 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between the EU and 
a group of Caribbean countries (CARIFORUM): “an adequate and effective 
 
71.  Panel Report, Canada–Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 7.92, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17,  2000).  
72.  The exceptions were the so-called “regulatory review provision” and the “stockpiling 
provision;” both exceptions allowed general drug manufacturers to override, in certain situations, the 
rights conferred on the patentee. See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, s. 55.2(1); Canadian Patent 
Act, R.S.C. 1985, s. 55.2(2).  
73.  Frederick Abbott, Compulsory Licensing for Public Health Needs: The TRIPS Agenda at 
the WTO after the Doha Declaration on Public Health 49–50 (Friends World Committee for 
Consultation, Occasional Paper No. 9, 2002).  
74.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, at art. 8 (emphasis added).  
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enforcement of intellectual property rights should . . . allow the EC Party and 
the Signatory CARIFORUM States to protect public health and nutrition.”75  
The references in the above legislative texts to “sectors of vital importance” 
and in particular “public health” and “nutrition” are to be interpreted as 
allowing states to take public interest measures in specific policy areas.76 
B. Differentiation and the Refusal of the Neutrality Principle 
If proposals like the ones put forward in this article were eventually 
implemented, this would probably confirm that patents and inventions are not 
all “equal” from a social utility perspective.  Indeed, a patent covering a new 
and innovative bottle opener cannot be compared, say, to an anti-retroviral 
drug: everyone agrees that saving human lives is more socially important than 
finding easier ways of opening bottles.  Patent legislators and judges would 
rather accept that difference and refuse to support what has often (and wrongly) 
been accepted in the past—that is a (by now) anachronistic and aseptic principle 
of neutrality of patents and of equal treatment of all inventions.  This is also 
what several economic circles believe; as the journal The Economist has 
recently put it in an article highly critical of the current excesses of the patent 
system, differentiation between patent rights “for different sorts of innovation 
are possible” and would be welcome.77 
According to the neutrality principle, based on the laissez-faire model of 
modern capitalistic systems,78 patent law should only concern itself with 
granting a monopolistic right without assessing whether inventions, for 
example, are socially meritorious, jeopardize the environment, or are harmful 
to human health, which result in patent law becoming “technology neutral” and 
meaning that the “wrong” kind of technologies might attract patent protection,79 
 
75.  Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM states, of the one part, and 
the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, CARIFORUM-EU, Oct. 15, 2008, 
O.J. 2008 (L 289) 3 (emphasis added).  
76.  Marco Ricolfi, Is There an Antitrust Antidote Against IP Overprotection Within TRIPs?, 
10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 305 (2006) (noting that “when problems exist only in certain product 
areas, and these involve important national public policies under Article 8(1), even measures or rules 
operating selectively may be TRIPs-compliant”). It should moreover be stressed that the protection of 
the public interest is one of the objectives pursued by the TRIPS Agreement, as confirmed by Article 
7: “the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion 
of technological innovation . . . in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare.” TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 46, at art. 7. The importance of protecting public health within TRIPS has also 
been stressed by the Doha Declaration. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 
November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002).  
77.  A Question of Utility, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.economist.com/node/
21660559.  
78.  See Atkinson & Sherman, supra note 63, at 169. 
79.  Estelle Derclaye, What Can Intellectual Property Law Learn from Happiness Research?, 
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for example, a particularly harmful food manufacturing process.  Such a 
principle, which excludes value judgements in intellectual property matters and 
treats all subject matter equally,80 has more in common with copyright law, as 
it would be unfair to subject the granting of copyright protection to judges’ 
subjective assessments regarding artistic and social merit. 
Yet, extending this principle to patent law is wrong.  An interesting point 
to note is that “despite patent law’s apparent neutrality, it [patent law] carries 
the seed of differentiation and can therefore allow for special treatment.”81  
First, we have seen that many jurisdictions already incorporate provisions—for 
example, the exclusion from patentability of inventions that are contrary to 
ordre public and morality as well as of surgical, diagnostic, and therapeutic 
methods—which inject into patent laws social considerations and concerns and, 
therefore, legitimize differential treatment.  The incorporation of public 
interest-focused provisions into patent statutes is not even a novelty of recent 
times.  The first UK Patent Statute of 1623 already stated that a patent could 
only be granted if it was “not contrary to law or mischievous to the State.”82  
This provision was confirmed in the UK Patent and Design Act of 188383 and 
in the Patent Act 1949 (when the predecessor of the current Patent Act already 
excluded from patentability inventions contrary to morality and “well-
established natural laws”).84 
That the neutrality principle is weak can be also inferred by looking at the 
intellectual property clause of the U.S. Constitution, which stresses that the 
reason why intellectual property rights are granted is to promote the “Progress 
of Science and Useful Arts.”85  The rationale behind this clause is to promote 
the development of useful inventions by offering inventors monopolistic rights 
 
in METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 196–97 (G Dinwoodie ed., Edward 
Elgar 2013). 
80.  See Estelle Derclaye, Patent Law’s Role in the Protection of Environment – Re-assessing 
Patent Law and its Justifications in the 21st Century, INT’L R. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. 249, 254 
(2009). 
81.  Id. at 251. 
82.  English Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6 (Eng.). Derclaye, Patent Law’s 
Role in the Protection of Environment, supra note 80, at 258. 
83.  See The Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act 1883, 46 & 47 Vict., c. 57, § 86. Section 
86 of this Act gave power to the Comptroller General of the Patent Office to reject a patent application 
if “the use would, in his opinion, be contrary to law or morality.” 
84.  Id. at § 19. Section 19 of this Act provided refusal of patents  
(1) if it appears to the comptroller in the case of any application for a patent—(a) that it is 
frivolous on the ground that it claims as an invention anything obviously contrary to well-
established natural laws; or (b) that the use of the invention in respect of which the 
application is made would be contrary to law or morality. 
Id.  
85.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.  
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for a limited period of time.  Yet, according to many commentators, the 
meaning of “progress” within that intellectual property clause is not neutral.  As 
has been noted, progress is not an end in itself, but rather an intermediate step 
towards other social goals.86  It should also include the improvement of human 
life, which in turn includes the general concept of well-being.87  That inevitably 
entails that inventions of highly social utility that are meant to deliver humanity 
greater benefits (like healthy foodstuff) fulfill that constitutional bargain better 
than inventions of little social value.88 
Proposals that aim at providing a differential and more socially oriented 
legal treatment have also been put forward in relation to an intellectual property 
right “close” to patents, namely the plant variety rights protection that countries 
are required to adopt under the TRIPS Agreement.89  It has indeed been 
proposed that such a system could be designed by introducing an additional 
condition, the so-called “value for cultivation and use” requirement (VCU).90  
Detailing the VCU requirement would then be left to national governments and 
would ensure that the developers of new plant varieties contribute to certain 
national priorities.  For example, for a new variety to acquire protection, VCU 
might require applicants to demonstrate their socio-economic or environmental 
benefits, such as how it might benefit small farmers in terms of enhancing 
productivity or requiring fewer external inputs.91 
C. The Paradox of the Neutrality Principle 
The neutrality principle of patents should also be rejected because of the 
paradox it creates.  For example, what if a patent office were to grant a patent 
in relation to an invention, say, covering a food product that contains a huge 
amount of saturated fat, sugar, or salt?  If we accept the neutrality principle, the 
 
86.  See Beier, supra note 26, at 423, 444 (stressing that “the assumption that all technological 
advances are beneficial to humanity and that progress need only be accelerated for everything to turn 
out well – this belief has largely disappeared by now. It has yielded, although still not universally, to 
the view that mankind and its social needs should come first and that science and technology must 
orient themselves toward human needs.”); Atkinson & Sherman, supra note 63, at 169. 
87.  See Derclaye, Intellectual Property Rights and Global Warming, supra note 38, at 268. 
88.  See Sarah Tran, supra note 33, at 36; See also Derclaye, What Can Intellectual Property 
Law Learn from Happiness Research?, supra note 79, at 197. 
89.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, at art. 27(3)(b). While this provision mandates 
countries to provide for the protection of plant varieties, it also allows them to choose the specific form 
of protection: either the patent system or an effective sui generis system (or a combination of them). 
According to several commentators, countries have freedom to devise the sui generis system according 
to their needs. See D Leskien & M Flitner, Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic Resources: 
Options for a Sui Generis System, ISSUES IN GENETIC RESOURCES (July 1997). 
90.  Leskien & Flitner, supra note 89, at 54–55. 
91.  See GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIOGENETIC RESOURCES AND 
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 62 (Earthscan 2004). 
BONADIO.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2017  11:51 PM 
260 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 20:2 
 
patent would certainly be valid.  Yet, due to increased awareness on the part of 
a number of legislators around the world keen to protect people’s health, the 
consumption of such a product could be prohibited in some countries or at least 
severely restricted by regulatory bodies, in order to avoid, for instance, 
consumption by children in schools (as poor eating habits developed at an early 
age can lead to a lifetime of serious health consequences and school is where 
young people spend most of their time and where they lay the foundations for 
healthy habits). 
The paradox, therefore, lies in the fact that in such circumstances public 
authorities—patent offices and regulatory bodies—would send contradictory 
messages.92  On the one hand, by granting patents they encourage and reward 
the making of inventions harmful to consumers and, on the other, by 
introducing strict regulatory measures they ban or limit the consumption of 
products incorporating such inventions.  This inconsistent outcome is the very 
essence of the neutrality principle, according to which each area of the law has 
a different and separate function to pursue and, accordingly, it is wrong for 
these functions to be confused and conflated.93 
The rejection of the neutrality principle would eliminate this paradox and 
inconsistency and make patent law and food law compatible with each other 
and complementary (such a result probably being achieved by the 
implementation of the third proposal highlighted in this article, especially in 
countries that experience an upsurge in the filing of patent applications for 
unhealthy food).  In actual fact, patent law, by excluding harmful food from 
patentability, might be more beneficial than food law, as the former would aim 
at discouraging the production of unhealthy products rather than merely 
restricting their consumption, which has been the aim of many regulatory 
measures under recent food legislation, but which may also cause negative 
externalities.  For example, a fat tax introduced by Denmark in 2011 to fight 
obesity and related diseases (hitting meat, pizza, butter, cheese, milk, oil, and 
processed food if the product contained more than 2.3 percent saturated fat) 
was later scrapped as it was perceived as regressive and as triggering cross-
border trade.94 
 
92.  See Derclaye, Should Patent Law Help Cool the Planet?, supra note 25, at 231 
(highlighting this paradox in the field of anti-global warming technologies). 
93.  See Atkinson & Sherman, supra note 63, at 169. 
94.  For more information on the nature and impact of fat taxes see Alberto Alemanno & 
Ignacio Carreno, Fat Taxes in the European Union: Between Fiscal Austerity and the Fight against 
Obesity, 4 EUR. J. RISK REG. 571–576 (2011). 
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D. Other Arguments and Counter-Arguments 
 in Relation to the Third Proposal 
One may also note that excluding the patentability of unhealthy food 
products and processes would allow any food operator to develop and sell at a 
lower price products incorporating such inventions because of the absence of 
monopolies granted by patents.  Paradoxically, this would, therefore, increase 
the dissemination of harmful foodstuffs.95 
This argument seems weak, however.  The argument that granting patents 
that protect controversial inventions might have the effect of reducing the 
availability of the relevant goods is not really convincing.  First, this is not 
always necessarily the case.  Indeed, when a patented invention is commercially 
successful, this may well trigger a rapid and massive dissemination of the 
product, regardless of whether the patentee keeps the price low or high.  
Second, the extent the invention is used should not really influence how patent 
law regulates patentable or unpatentable subject matter, especially when public 
authorities do not want to encourage research in controversial fields, such as 
the development of unhealthy foods.  As has been correctly pointed out, “if the 
moral worth of an invention is debatable, then the degree in which it is exploited 
should not temper the law’s attitude to it.”96 
Another argument that may be used to oppose the third proposal revolves 
around the ordre public and morality clause contained in several patent 
legislations, including the TRIPS Agreement and the EPC.  We have already 
seen that such a provision excludes from patentability inventions whose 
exploitation is contrary to public policy and accepted principles of morality.  
Yet such exploitation—as made clear in TRIPS and the EPC, for example—is 
not deemed immoral or against ordre public simply because it is prohibited by 
local laws or regulations.97  A similar provision is contained in the Paris 
Convention: “The grant of a patent shall not be refused and a patent shall not 
be invalidated on the ground that the sale of the patented product or of a product 
obtained by means of a patented process is subject to restrictions or limitations 
resulting from the domestic law.”98  These rules basically entail that an inventor 
would still be able to get a patent from a patent office even where the regulatory 
body of that country prohibits the exploitation of the relevant product or 
process.  The rationale is that, if it is the case that further evidence is later 
 
95.  A similar argument was presented by the patent owner in the case T 0315/03, Transgenic 
Animals/HARVARD (OJ 2004). 
96.  Thambisetty, supra note 53, at 49. 
97.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, at art. 27(2); See also EPC, supra note 47, at 
art.53(a). 
98.  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 4-quarter, opened for 
signature Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised 1967).  
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brought that convinces the regulatory body to lift the ban, the still valid patent 
would then become exploitable. 
Yet, such rules and rationale would not fit well with the patenting of a 
foodstuff that is undisputedly considered unhealthy.  Take a food invention 
containing a hugely excessive amount in fat, saturated fat, salt, or sugar.  
Pursuant to the above mentioned rules, that invention would still be patentable 
even when, as is highly likely, the consumption of the relevant product or 
process is severely restricted on food safety grounds.  Yet, in this case chances 
are slim that regulatory bodies might be convinced by new evidence about an 
alleged lack of harmful effects. 
It would, therefore, be recommend to modify the above TRIPS Agreement, 
the EPC, and the Paris Convention provisions.  That could be done by 
specifying that, where the ban or restriction of the exploitation of a product or 
process is based on clear and indisputable scientific evidence (such as in the 
case of food containing an excessive amount of fat, saturated fat, salt, or sugar), 
countries would still be able to exclude that invention from patentability on 
ordre public or morality grounds.  Such a legislative move would again make 
patent law and food law align in pursuit of the same goal. 
Finally, it could be argued that the third proposal might not be good and 
effective because (it could be stressed) what is harmful to human health is not 
the occasional consumption of, say, foodstuffs containing an excessive amount 
of transfat or sugar.  Rather, it is the continued and systematic consumption of 
such food that would be harmful.  In other words, we should not talk about 
unhealthy food, but just about unhealthy diets.  However, this argument also 
seems weak.  A product or process should be deemed unpatentable—I 
believe—because of its inherent capability to harm people’s health, no matter 
what amount is necessary to actually cause such harm.  If we were to accept 
that it is only the abuse of a certain invention that triggers its unpatentability on 
ordre public or morality grounds, the result would be absurd.  For example, an 
extremely polluting exhaust pipe for cars might attract patent protection on the 
assumption that its occasional use by a car driver would not have hugely 
negative effects on the environment (such effects would only materialize in 
case of cumulative use by a broad category of users).  Yet, what should be taken 
into account for the purposes of deciding whether an invention must be 
excluded from patentability again is not how much the relevant product or 
process is used, but its inherent ability to harm people, the environment, and 
other public goods. 
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E. Unreasonable and Cumbersome Proposals? 
I also believe the three proposals in question do not create unreasonable 
conditions on the acquisition of patents on food related inventions.  They, 
therefore, do not run contrary to the TRIPS Agreement.99 
First, they would not place excessively heavy burdens on patent offices and 
applicants.  The objection that patent offices and judges would be ill-equipped 
to verify whether the relevant food product or process is healthy or harmful (a 
task beyond the skills of patent officers) could be overcome.  For example, 
patent officers could be partnered with experts, such as professors and 
specialists in food safety, who could be questioned about technical issues.  The 
idea of getting experts involved in patent procedures is indeed not new, as some 
patent offices already rely on them, for example, when dealing with 
biotechnological inventions.100 
The latest developments in food safety and nutritional science would also 
help overcome the scientific uncertainties that have for a long time surrounded 
the distinction between healthy and unhealthy foods.  Indeed, efforts have 
recently been made by regulators to devise an appropriate categorization system 
that allows for the differentiation of foods that are high in fat, saturated fat, salt, 
or sugar.  The UK Food Standards Agency has, for instance, developed a 
nutrient profiling model as a tool for categorizing foods for children on the basis 
of objective criteria and, in particular, their nutrient content.101  This model, 
which has been adopted by the UK media and communications regulator 
Ofcom to regulate the advertising and promotion of foods to children, uses a 
simple scoring system that recognizes the contribution made by beneficial 
nutrients that are important in a child’s diet (i.e. protein, fibre, fruit and 
vegetables, and nuts) and penalizes foods with ingredients that children should 
eat less of (saturated fats, salt, and sugars).102 
Also, the fact that applicants would obtain an expedited examination and 
would not be required to pay fees to patent their healthy food inventions does 
not make the first and second proposals described in this article unfeasible.  It 
could indeed be said that examining patent applications—which involves a 
 
99.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, at art. 62(1). 
100. See Enrico Bonadio, Patents and Morality in Europe, in DIVERSITY IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY – IDENTITIES, INTERESTS, AND INTERSECTIONS (I. Calboli & S. Ragavan eds, Cambridge 
University Press 2015). 
101. For more information see Broadcast Media for Children: Nutrient Profiling, FOOD 
STANDARDS AGENCY, http://www.food.gov.uk/northern-ireland/nutritionni/niyoungpeople/nutlab/#.
Ugn2GVMgYfo (last visited Apr. 3, 2016).  
102. See Guide to Using the Nutrient Profiling Model, FOOD STANDARDS AGENCY, 
http://www.food.gov.uk/northern-ireland/nutritionni/niyoungpeople/nutlab/nutprofmod (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2016).   
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significant amount of work by examiners—quickly or without charging fees 
would make the whole procedure cumbersome and, thus, unreasonably difficult 
to manage.  Yet, I believe such an objection could be overcome by re-
emphasizing that these procedures are aimed at pursuing an overriding public 
interest, hence rendering rather weak any allegation that the system would be 
unfeasible (and anyway understaffed patent offices could be supplemented by 
hiring more experts in the specific field).  As has been noted in relation to U.S. 
fast-track procedures for green technologies, requiring extra fees for receiving 
the accelerated review would upset “the balance of the constitutional patent 
bargain by over-burdening the parties most likely to promote ‘the Progress of 
Science and Useful Arts.’”103 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has highlighted a serious problem of contemporary society: 
namely the obesity and other NCDs caused by the consumption of unhealthy 
food and how such problem may be tackled by relying on patent regimes. 
I do believe that the patent system could play a positive role in this specific 
regard, by encouraging (not mandating) food companies and inventors to 
produce and bring to market healthier foodstuffs.  I am convinced that patent 
law has the potential to modify behaviors to promote good corporate and 
scientific conduct.104  Conversely, I oppose views that consider the patent 
system as neutral to, and insulated from, any public policy considerations 
including human health.  In other papers, I have made the point that public 
policy and morality related concerns are actually embedded in and permeate 
the patent system and that the latter should therefore serve as a social filter.105  
In other words, patent law cannot be considered in a vacuum nor can it neglect 
considerations and concerns related to products and processes whose 
exploitation poses serious threats to society,106 such as the diseases caused by 
the consumption of unhealthy food.  Conversely, patent law should be 
considered as the servant of public policy and be justified by the benefits it is 
capable of bringing.107  This is even more so if we look at the general purpose 
of the patent system, that is, to incentivize (before) and reward (after) the 
making of inventions useful to our society.  The proposals put forward in this 
article serve that purpose: that is, they would aim to push research and 
 
103.  Tran, supra note 33, at 128; US CONST. art. 1, § 8.  
104.  See Brad Sherman, Regulating Access and Use of Genetic Resources: Intellectual 
Property Law and Biodiscovery, EUR. INTELL. PROP. R. 301, 305–06 (2003). 
105.  See Bonadio, supra note 100. See also Angus J. Wells, Patenting New Life Forms: An 
Ecological Perspective, EUR. INTELL. PROP. R. 111, 115 (1994). 
106.  See Thambisetty, supra note 53, at 52.  
107.  See Alexander, supra note 68, at 113. 
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development in the food industry towards healthier paths —and would do so 
by stretching the capacity of the patent system to respond to new public policy 
challenges and to be complementary to another area of law, namely food law. 
By either facilitating and speeding up the patenting process of healthy food 
or by excluding harmful ones from patentability, the implementation of these 
proposals would send clear messages that: (i) inventions that are of a greater 
social value, like healthy foodstuffs, should be patented faster and more cheaply 
and, thus, reach markets more quickly; and (ii) patenting “anything under the 
sun which is made by man”108 would not be possible anymore.109 
Also, the proposals put forward in this article are in line with some recent 
studies, such as the happiness and intellectual property-related research carried 
out by Estelle Derclaye: this scholar rightly noted that if we want patents and 
related rights to be legitimate, we need to go further and base patent regimes on 
stronger universal values and goals.110  In other words, patent law should focus 
more on “needs,” not “wants,” and, therefore, encourage investments in 
necessities, not luxuries.111  It should be used not only for merely economic 
purposes, but also as a tool to regulate the impact of technology on the 
environment or health.112  The argument that intellectual property law should 
take into account sustainable development is not new and has recently been put 
forward by other academics, such as Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan,113 as well as 
Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman.114  The latter scholars in particular noted that 
there is no reason why the patent system, as a regulatory tool, should 
only be used in the pursuit of economic ends, nor any reason why 
 
108.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
109.  In fact, the above statement by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chakrabarty does not 
completely reflect the reality of the patent system as, in the U.S. (and in many other jurisdictions), a 
number of inventions are excluded from patentability on many grounds including public interest 
grounds. 
110.  See Derclaye, What Can Intellectual Property Law Learn from Happiness Research?, 
supra note 79, at 528. 
111.  See id. at 532, 536 (also noting that “technology, and thus patents and related rights, can 
bring happiness in the sense that they correspond to needs. For example, with technology, inventors 
can enable food security, invent new pharmaceuticals, create non-polluting, renewable energy, and 
facilitate sustainable production of goods and services.”). 
112.  See Derclaye, Patent Law’s Role in the Protection of Environment, supra note 80, at 269. 
113.  See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The Concept of Sustainable Development in 
International IP Law – New Approaches from EU Economic Partnership Agreements?, in THE 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CAN ONE SIZE FIT ALL? 308–42, 322 (Annette Kur 
and Vytautas Mizaras eds, Edward Elgar 2011) (highlighting “the promotion of creativity, innovation 
and competitiveness as a means of achieving the goal of sustainable development” and noting that “the 
protection of IP is no end in itself, but merely an (important) tool for achieving those means”).  
114.  See LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 381 (Oxford 
U. Press 2014).  
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“external” factors such as . . . health should not fall within the core 
remit of the patent system . . . arguments of this nature are beginning to 
have an influence on patent law, particularly in relation to . . . food 
security.115 
As shown above, I also believe that the proposals put forward in this article 
would not place excessively heavy burdens on patent offices.  The assessment 
of the harmfulness or healthiness of products or processes does not seem an 
insuperable obstacle.  Integrating technical experts into patent examiners’ 
teams would help in confirming whether a food related invention carries the 
health benefits claimed in the application. 
The proposed fast-track procedure for patenting healthy food may also be 
promising.  A quick look at the data gathered with reference to the accelerated 
programs already implemented in some countries in the field of green 
technologies is quite telling: the time taken to grant patents in this sector has 
been “cut by between [forty-two] percent and [seventy-five] percent across fast-
track programs, with the shortest time to grant being delivered by the UK” 
(seventy-five percent).116  If such program work for green technologies, there 
is no reason why similar systems could not work for healthy food.  As stressed 
by the former Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and 
Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, David Kappos, “We’re 
already experimenting with various ways of enabling applicants to receive 
accelerated review of technologies in areas that are priorities . . . like green 
technology . . . and we’ll be considering accelerated reviews in other categories 
of innovation that are also vital to our national interests.”117 
Obviously, the proposals in question are not being put forward as the only 
solution to combatting obesity and other illnesses caused by consumption of 
unhealthy foods.  Yet, they may be part of a wider global and national answer 
aimed at fighting such diseases, including tax incentives for the production of 
healthier food. 
 
 
 
115.  Id.   
116.  See Fast-Tracking Green Patent Applications, WIPO MAG. (June 2013), 
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2013/03/article_0002.html.   
117.  David Kappos, Notice of Public Meeting; Request for Comments (May 25, 2010), 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2012/week52/TOCCN/item-252.htm.  
